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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH 
JOHX E. :JicX ... \UGHTO~ and 
HEXRIETT ... \ ~IcX ... \UGHTON, 
Pla£ntijj's and Respondents, 
-YS.-
JOH~ B. E ... \TON, et al., 
Defenda1lts and Appellants. 
Respondents Brief 
NATURE OF CASE 
Respondents brought this suit to quiet title to water 
which arises in the MeN a ugh ton Gulch between two speci-
fied points. The appellants claim the right to divert 
water from the McNaughton Gulch at points down-
stream. This appeal was taken from a decree in favor 
of the respondents. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Before turning to a detailed statement of the facts, 
we set forth in general the basic contentions of the ap-
pellants and in general describe our answer thereto. It 
1. 
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is thought that this general statement of our respective 
positions will be helpful to the court in reading the 
statement of facts which follows immediately below. The 
appellants make four basic contentions: 
1. That they were deprived of a fair trial by the 
fact that the trial court decided the case on the theory 
that the waters in question were private waters. 
The appellants had a fair trial. The pleadings claim 
only general ownership of the water; the trial produced 
evidence which would be immaterial if the theory of 
prior appropriation were the only claim; the record 
shows at page 201 that the plaintiff asserted ownership 
of the water because it arose on his land, and counsel 
for the plaintiff objected to the characterization of the 
McNaughton Gulch as a water course. Nearly three full 
months transpired after the· judge made his memorandum 
decision, yet the appellants failed to produce a single 
affidavit or to make any showing that there was addi-· 
tional evidence which they could produce if given a 
chance. They thus completely disregarded Rule 59, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure,· and have failed to show any 
prejudice. 
2. Appellants complain that the court erred in 
failing to conclude that these waters were public waters 
subject to public appropriation. We contend that the 
court did not so err. Further, the court found as a matter 
.of fact that the respondents under the doctrine of prior 
appropriation, which appellants argue for, were prior 
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in time and in right to the appellants. Therefore, had the 
court concluded as a matter of la'Y that the 'vnters in 
question 'Yere public 'Ynters, it 'vould have been com-
pelled under its findings of fact to enter judgment for 
respondents. 
3. That the court's findings on all facts necessary 
to sho'v a prior appropriation were immaterial and 
should be disregarded here because the trial court could 
haYe reached its present decision without making those 
findings. The authorities hold that the Supreme Court 
will not assume that the trial court made findings with-
out having considered all the evidence. These findings 
are therefore controlling in the event this court decides 
that the \Vaters are subject to appropriation. 
4. That the evidence does not support the various 
findings of the trial court. We will make appropriate 
record citations to show that the record amply supports 
each challenged finding. 
THE FACTS 
The respondents have not even purported to give 
a complete statement of the facts. It will, therefore, be 
necessary for the respondents to do so. Found in the 
very sketchy statement of facts set forth by the appel-
lants are numerous misstatements. To take each mis-
statement and show wherein it disregards the record 
would require a rather lengthy section in this brief and 
yet would not present the facts in a logical order. 
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In addition to the numerous misstatements of the 
record, appellants challenge the trial court's findings in 
nine particulars. There are only 12 findings and it 
seems to us that the best way to bring the facts to the 
attention of this court is for us to quote the :findings, one 
by one, and cite the record to support each of them. 
THE FINDINGS 
Finding Number One is a formal recital of the resi-
dence of the parties. 
Number Two recites that additional parties were 
added to the suit (R. 227-8). 
Number Three is a recital that John McNaughton 
is the owner of 80 acres of land. (This is supported by 
R. 141 and ownership plat Exhibit B). It is then found 
that the lands are by nature arid, but with irrigation 
will produce crops. Carroll testified that for 50 years 
McNaughtons have raised crops on these lands (R. 45); 
MeN aughton testified that all the gulch water was neces-
sary to irrigate the lands (R. 152. See also 101, 221, 29) ; 
and that practically the entire 80 acres are irrigated · 
(R. 149). 
Number Four: "That there is a natural depression 
or wash which runs in a general Southeasterly direction 
across the lands described; that said depression is com-
monly known as the MeN a ugh ton Gulch;'' (The loca-
tion of the gulch is shown on a map (traced from aerial 
photo) Exhibit A; and on Exhibit 1, (drawn to scale 
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by an engineer), and the gulch is described by numerous 
'Yitnt•sscs (See, for example, R. 40). The court continues : 
· •that said gulch in its natural condition prior to 1885 
"~as dry and no 'Yater flo,Yed therein;'' Gardner testified 
at R. 4 that in 1883 the ~I eX a ugh ton Gulch 'vas "a dry 
gulch." (See also R. 16). The court then found: "that 
said gulch is intersected about one mile to the west of 
the i\IrXaughton property by the Ashley Upper Canal, 
(R. 40, and Exhibit .J._l), that said canal was constructed 
in about 1885 (R. 4) and has been used since said date 
to con,ey irrigation water for use .on lands adjacent to 
and above the described gulch and on other lands;" (R. 
11, 40, 158), ''that said gulch runs from the Ashley 
Upper Canal Southeasterly through Section 20, Town-
ship 4 South, Range 21 East, S. L. B. & M., crosses the 
highway to Maeser and enters the West 40 acre tract 
of the McNaughton property" described above and goes 
Southeasterly to Ashley Central Canal. (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit A, which was stipulated to be a tracing from an 
aerial photograph, shows the location of the gulch and 
the two canals referred to in the finding. Defendant's 
Exhibit 1 prepared by a licensed engineer shows the 
same general area drawn to scale.) 
Finding Number Five: ''That there are lands lying 
both to the North and to the South of the MeN aughton 
Gulch which are irrigated from the Ashley Upper Canal; 
that the natural slope of said lands is toward the gulch 
(R. 40, 261); that through the irrigation of these adja-
cent lands seepage and waste waters find their way by 
percolation, seepage and surface run-off to the MeN a ugh-
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ton Gulch.'' Carroll testified at Page 41 of transcript 
that: 
"I have seen seepage water in the gulch; it 
is according to the year. Dry years there would 
be no water at all between the Carroll diversion 
(McNaughton's first diversion point) and the 
canal; wet years there would be seepage water 
between those points.'' 
At Pag~ 40, Carroll said that slope of the lands on 
I 
each side of the gulch is toward the gulch ; the lands on 
each side are irrigated from the Ashley Upper Canal. 
At Page 52 he was asked: 
'' Q. Do the upper irrigators permit their 
waste water to run into the gulch~ 
A Y . " . es, s1r. 
John McNaughton testified on this point at Page 
158: 
"It (variation of water in the gulch) is caused 
by the amount of irrigation on each· side of the 
gulch; that is one of the causes. And, of course, 
from the use of the water by the neighbors above. 
Sometimes they are not so careful about their 
water, they let it run through, and return waste 
water, so the gulch fluctuates from waste water 
as well as the seepage water." 
John Gardner testified at Page 16: 
That in 1886 the gulch was dry above the 
Carroll dam except for water from the canal. 
'' Q. But if they shut the water off at the 
canal, would water come into the gulch anyway~ 
A. There was no water coming into the 
gulch ; there was no land farmed above there.'' 
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Of course Gardner \Yns tPstifying concerning condi-
tions baek in lSSG and the remark that there was no 
"Tater in the gulch exeept canal \Yater because there were 
no lands being irrigated along the gulch is important in 
supporting the court's conclusion that the water in the 
gulch had its origin in upper irrigation. 
The defendants also called an engineer who pre-
pared Exhibit 1 and \Yho checked the ground rather 
carefully. He testified at Page 261 that the slope of the 
land is to,Yard the gulch and at Page 260 that water 
was running into the gulch as surface run-off from upper 
irrigation. There is other like evidence from other wit-
nesses, but the above certainly would support the chal-
lenged finding. 
The court in finding Number Five proceeds: "that 
the amount of water thus finding its way into the Me-
N aughton Gulch varies from day to day and from season 
to season, depending upon the irrigation practices pre-
vailing on these adjacent lands." Appellants say (Page 
29) that the court ''will look in vain'' for any evidence 
to support this finding. Two witnesses testified in ac-
cordance \Yith the court's finding in almost the words 
used by the court. Carroll testified at Page 52 : 
'' Q. Is the amount which flows therein con-
sistent from day to day, and season to season~ 
A. Varies all the time. 
Q. Does it vary day to day in the same 
season~ 
A. Yes, because we have irrigation on each 
side, and sometimes the waste water runs in and 
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it will raise, and the next day somebody shuts 
their water off and there won't be as much in 
there. 
Q. Do the upper irrigators permit their waste 
water to run into the gulch' 
A Y . '' . es, s1r. 
John McNaughton testified (R. 158): 
"Well, I have observed the gulch for all these 
years, and I find that the gulch fluctuates from 
year to year and day to day, and it is pretty hard 
to tell just how much water you are going to 
have, ... 
Q. Do you know what causes it to fluctuate 
from day to day' 
A. It is caused by the amount of irrigation 
on each side of the gulch; that is one of the causes. 
And, of course, from the use of the water by the 
neighbors above. Sometimes they are not so 
careful about their water, they let it run through 
and return waste water, so the gulch fluctuates 
from waste water as well as the seepage water." 
The court in finding Number Five proceeds: ''that 
the amount of water available for diversion from the 
gulch on to the McNaughton lands is not measureable; 
(Carroll so testified, R. 53, 55) that in 1885 the amount 
of land surrounding the MeN aughton Gulch which was 
being irrigated was not sufficient to produce any sho,v-
ing of drainage water from that source, either surface 
or subterranean, in the McNaughton Gulch. (Gardner 
so testified, R. 16) that in 1886 seepage waters began to 
appear in the McNaughton Gulch and a dam was con-
structed in that year. in the McNaughton Gulch by the 
predecessors in interest of the plaintiff, (and others 
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''"hose identity is not material to this litigation) in Sec-
tion :20, Range ~1 East, Township 4 South, SLB&M, at 
a point located on properties no'v owned by Roy Carroll, 
and located in said gulch about 500 yards west of the 
aforementioned road to :Thiaeser.'' Gardner so testified 
(R. 5; See also Exhibit .A.) "that the \Yater was diverted 
at said point into an artificial ditch which is now com-
monly called the 'middle ditch' across the Carroll prop-
erty to the plaintiffs' land ·and the land of others; that 
said dam has been continuously used and water has been 
di,erted at said point from 1886 to the present time for 
the irrigation of the lands of the plaintiff John E. Me-
N a ugh ton described above.'' Several witnesses so testi-
fied: Gardner, R. 6, 7 ; Carroll, remembers use of Car-
roll di,ersion for 52 years, R. 42; McNaughton, 159). 
Finding Number Six: ''The volume of seepage or 
waste water flowing into the McNaughton Gulch has in-
creased with the increased irrigation (Rudy so testified, 
R. 234) within its drainage area, until at the high point 
of flow there may be several cubic feet per second flowing 
in the gulch (R. 71), but the flow is not constant (R. 52, 
171) and the amount at its lowest ebb is of a negligible 
amount (R. 152, 157). At least at one time the gulch 
was known to dry up completely during the non-irriga-
tion season; that the seepage water since its first showing 
has oozed into the sides and the bottom of the gulch 
throughout its length, but in a number of places along 
its sides and below the general surface of the ground 
as the flow has increased it has collected into little chan-
nels which have the appearance of springs which flow 
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varying amounts of water. The so-called springs have 
the same characteristics as the ooze in response to the 
flow of the irrigating water upon the surface of the lands 
surrounding the gulch, and all of the water thus finding 
its way into the McNaughton Gulch has its origin origi-
nally in the Ashley Upper Canal, which secures its water 
from natural sources many miles distant from the Me-
N a ugh ton Gulch.'' Carroll said that in dry years there 
was no water at all at the Carroll diversion (R. 41 ). 
Gardner said it was a dry gulch in 1885 (R. 4) ; that 
there was little irrigation in 1886 and the gulch had 
no water except that from the canal (R. 16); Rudy said 
that the flow increased from year to year after he built 
the Rudy Dam (R. 234). Lewis testified that the flow 
in the gulch would come after they started irrigating 
the farm lands above (R. 82). Carroll said that there 
was not much water in the gulch after irrigation stops 
(R. 56); that livestock owners took their livestock to 
the Canal in the winter for water (R. 55). Frank Lee 
said the gulch had seepage water and that there was 
not much seepage in the winter time (R. 37). The 
testimony of Carroll and McNaughton that the stream 
1vas made up of seepage and irrigation waste water is 
set forth above. In addition, see the testimony of 
MeN a ugh ton at page 206 where he says the stream is 
made up of drainage water and surface waste water. 
MeN aughton said (R. 152, 157) that at times there is 
not much water in the gulch, not enough to irrigate his 
farm and he has to commingle canal water with it to 
make up a stream. 
10 
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Finding Number Seven: ''That the canal waters 
are turned dirertly from the Ashley Upper Canal ·into 
the nlrXanghton Gulch at the point \Yhere said canal and 
guleh intersect about one mile \Vest of plaintiff's laiH1~, 
and are permitted to flow down said gulch to the afore-
mentioned Carroll Dam, \Yhere they are diverted through 
the middle ditch and on to the lands of the plaintiffs 
and others ; (See R. 5, 42, 155, 154) that said diversions 
from the .. A .. shley Upper Canal were made pursuant to 
rights under stock owned by the MeN a ugh tons and others 
in the .A .. shley Upper Canal Company (see R. 154) and 
from 1886 (R. 5, 42) to the present time the waters which 
have seeped in the MeN a ugh ton Gulch above the Carroll 
Dam have flowed down to the Carroll Dam sometimes 
by themselYes and sometimes while commingled with 
canal water being delivered to stockholders and have 
been used by the plaintiffs and their predecessors and 
others (whose names and identities are not material 
herein) for the irrigation of the lands of the plaintiffs 
described above, and of said other persons; that none 
of the persons so using said waters were predecessors 
in interest of any of the defendants (See R. 5).'' 
Finding Number Eight: ''That below the Carroll 
Dam and above the plaintiffs' lands described above, 
other waters accumulated in the McNaughton Gulch in 
the manner above set forth; that in about 1895 the 
plaintiffs' predecessors in interest constructed a tight 
dam across the MeN a ugh ton Gulch near the Southeast 
corner of plaintiffs' West 40 acre tract described above, 
which dam impounded and diverted the waters accumu-
11 
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lating in the McNaughton Gulch between said dam and 
the Carroll Dam. (See Gardner's testimony that in 1896 
when he was sixteen years old he went swimming in the 
big pond formed by this dam and it had been in "a long 
time before that" (R. 8, Rudy, R. 234.) Every other wit-
ness testifying on this point admitted that the dam had 
been in from the date of his first memory. McNaughton 
testified that he could remember since 1900 and the dam 
was in then (R. 139-41). Carroll could remember the dam 
for about 52 years or back to about 1897 or 98 (R. 42-3). 
The only witness for defendants who was familiar with 
the early history of this construction was on the Me-
N a ugh ton place in 1903. He said the dam was in then 
( R. 88). There is no evidence to the contrary. 
The court proceeds with the :finding: ''That the 
plain tiffs' predecessors diverted water through one ditch 
running to the South and another ditch running to the 
North of said dam for the irrigation of the above de-
scribed lands now owned by the plaintiffs.'' There is 
some conflict in the evidence as to whether there was a 
ditch to the North. Everyone admitted that there was a 
ditch to the South (R. 44, 62, 7 4, 116, 140, 232). As to 
the ditch to the North, the following witnesses testified 
that it existed: Gardner, R. 8; Carroll, R. 44; Tysack, 
R. 19; Merkley, R. 62; Lewis, R. 7 4; MeN a ugh ton, R. 140; 
Rudy, R. 232. Other witnesses denied that the North 
ditch was in prior to 1912 .. (See Hazel Hoeft, R. 113). 
But she admits that the ditch to North was in by 1912 
(R. 114); E. Hoeft was on McNaughton property once 
when he was 8 years old (1903); he was running down 
12 
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Xorth side of big· dam and sn"y no ditch to the North (R. 
89). He kne'v of diY(\rsion to South, ho,Yever (R. 89). 
Hoeft admitted that by 1910 or 1911 he saw a ditch to 
the Xorth (R. 89). Ross, "\Yho admitted that he had little 
familiarity 'Yith ~IcXaughton place and in past 48 years 
had never had an occasion to be on the place (R. 337) 
although he owned lands now owned by defendants, said 
that there was no ditch to the North (R. 321). The court 
could probably haYe found that the ditch to the North 
was not constructed until 1910-12, but certainly the over-
whelming preponderance of the evidence is to the effect 
that it was in prior to 1900. 
The court then proceeds: "that said dam (Me-
N aughton Dam) consisted of a dirt fill.'' Everyone so 
testified and also testified that it was a tight dam which 
would not bypass \V"ater through it (Gardner, R. 12; Ty-
zack, R. 19; ~ferkley, R. 63 ; Lewis, R. 73 ; E. Hoeft, R. 
100; McNaughton, R. 140). The testimony was that no 
water went through or over the dam and that it was as 
noted above diverted onto the MeN aughton field. On 
not overflowing, see also two of defendants' witnesses : 
Ed Hoeft (R. 100), who remembered_ it in 1903, nnd 
H. Hoeft, who remembered it in 1906 (R. 116). 
The court then found: "that said dam has been 
maintained across the McNaughton Gulch at all times 
since about 1895, except for short periods of time, less 
than one year's duration, when the dam has washed out 
and subsequently been replaced." On the dam being in 
since 1895 we have already set the evidence forth above 
(See R. 8, 139-41, 42-43, 88). As to the dam being main-
13 
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tained, see R. 15, 71, 100, 207. At page 71 Merkley said 
he had been on MeN aughton lands every year for 40 
years and that the dam was always maintained as a 
tight dam. Gardner said dam was in all the time he was 
in that area (R. 15). Defendants' witness Hoeft said 
that dam was washed out occasionally but that it was 
always replaced (R. 100). 
Finding Number Nine: "That prior to 1900 a net-
work of ditches was constructed on the McNaughton 
properties described above from the Carroll Dam'' (R. 
5-8, 42, 148, 207) "and the McNaughton Dam located 
near the Southeast corner of the West 40 acre tract, 
which dam has been mentioned above; that water could 
and can be diverted from the MeN aughton Gulch and 
could and can be applied to all of the MeN aughton lands 
described above except approximately three acres in the 
Northwest corner of the West 40 acre tract, and approxi-
mately four acres located South of the McNaughton 
Gulch on the West 40 acre tract and the waters from the 
gulch have been used on said lands since the two dams 
referred to were first constructed.'' In addition to the 
evidence of the Carroll ditch cited above and the two 
ditches to the North and South from the big McNaughton 
Dam, !fcNaughton testified that the North ditch went 
to the extreme North end of the property (R. 143), that 
the ditches now are as they were in 1900 (R. 207; that 
except for a small tract in the Northwest corner of the 
property and small tract in Southwest corner, the entire 
80 acre farm could be irrigated by using the Carroll and 
the MeN a ugh ton Dams. He fixed the size of these tracts 
14 
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at 21;~ acres eaeh (R. 14-!--!6). ''Titness Horrocks cor-
roborated him in this regard (R. 358-9). There is also 
eYidence of a diYersion from a third dam near a slaughter 
honsl~ which diYerted "\Yater to the North many years 
ago (R·. 139, ~9, 7-!). 
Finding Number Ten : ''That there is also a wash 
or gulch located on the ~IcNaughton land to the North 
of the ~I eX a ugh ton Gulch; that said last mentioned gulch 
has no common name; that it runs more or less parallel 
to the l\IcX a ugh ton Gulch; that it is not nearly so deep 
as the ~IcXaughton.Gulch and begins on the McNaughton 
lands near the middle of the West 40 acre tract; that at 
the lower end of this North gulch there is a drain ditch 
which commences a few feet North of the North gulch 
and extends across the East end of the McNaughton 
property and empties into the MeN a ugh ton Gulch; that 
the slope of the land is from the North gulch to the Mc-
Naughton Gulch so that any water flowing into said drain 
ditch will flow into the MeN a ugh ton Gulch; that said 
drain ditch crosses over the most Westerly ditch used 
by any of the defendants leading from their upper point 
of diversion and said drain ditch empties the water into 
the MeN aughton Gulch above all other points of diver-
sion of the defendants from the MeN a ugh ton Gulch.'' 
(The North gulch is described, R. 142-43, 261. It is also 
shown on plaintiffs' Exhibit A and on defendants' Ex-
hibit 1). The drain ditch is also shown on the two exhi-
bits. It was so constructed that it will catch all excess 
waters, if any, placed on McNaughton's lands and return 
them directly to the McNaughton Gulch (R. 261). This 
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was noted by the trial court and is noted here because 
even if there were sufficient water in the McNaughton 
Gulch at McNaughton's big, permanent dam to more 
than supply the needs of his lands (which there is not, 
R. 101, 152, 29, 221) it could not prejudice these defend-
ants. The excess would be returned by the drain ditch 
directly to the gulch. It would return above all of the 
defendants' points of diversion except one and it crosses 
over that one. The court so found and Exhibits A and] 
both show it. 
Finding Number Eleven : ''Generally throughout 
the length of the gulch along its sides below the line 
where the water percolates, there are now cresses and 
succulent grasses growing, and at the sites where the 
water issues into the gulch, willows have grown up. 
There is no evidence that any of these conditions per-
tained prior to 1886 before canal water was :first applied 
in the drainage area, but the evidence is and the court 
:finds that the gulch was dry prior to said time.'' Me-
N aughton said that plants grow in the gulch itself (R. 
141) ; Lewis told of gathering water cress ( R. 81) ; and, 
of course, the judge viewed the premises after the trial 
and as a part of the evidence (R. 386) and the court 
observed the cresses and willows in the gulch. As to it 
being a dry gulch prior to 1886, see R. 4 and 16 and other 
discussion set forth above. 
Finding Number Twelve: That in about 1920 some 
of the defendants were involved in a quiet title suit to 
determine the extent of their rights to the waters of 
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nlcX a ugh ton Gulch; that neither the plaintiffs nor their 
predecessors "'"ere parties to that suit; that the defend-
ants divert "Tater from the McNaughton Gulch from 
three dams located below the last mentioned dam on the 
ill eX a ugh ton property; that all of said dams used by 
the defendants to divert ":ater from the McNaughton 
Gulch were constructed after the dam maintained by the 
~lc~ aughtons near the Southeast corner of the West 40 
acre tract; that waters percolate and seep into the Me-
N aughton Gulch below the last mentioned dam main-
tained by the plaintiffs and flow into said McNaughton 
Gulch along its entire length below said McNaughton 
Dam and until the MeN a ugh ton Gulch empties into the 
Ashley Central Canal.'' 
The decree between the defendants was offered at 
R. 300. Plaintiffs objected to it for any purpose except 
to show defendants' claims as against each other and 
defendants' counsel confessed that it would not be bind-
ing as to the MeN aughtons. It was admitted in evi-
dence (R. 301) but of course could have had no binding 
effect on the plaintiffs who were not parties to that 
decree. The three dams used by the defendants and 
identified in that decree are the Rudy Dam, the Tyzack 
Dam and the Mantle Dam (R. 374, Exhibits 1 and A). 
The dams as they occur on the gulch starting upstream 
are then as follows : The Carroll Dam, built in 1886 and 
used by the plaintiffs (R. 5). There was an old dam 
near the corrals on the McNaughton property which 
diverted water to the North (R. 139, 29, 74). It was con-
structed according to McNaughton prior to 1900 (R. 139) 
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but has not been rec.ently used except for occasional 
pumping (R. 144). Then comes the big dam which is 
some 20 feet high, 100 feet long and backs water up as 
much as 150 yards (R. 20, 218). It had been there a 
long time in 1896 according to Gardner (R. 8). Other 
witnesses as noted above remembered it as having been 
constructed prior to 1900 (R. 19, 43, 74, 139-41, 231). 
Then came the Rudy Dam, built by witness Rudy. Rudy 
said that the MeN a ugh ton Dam was already in when 
he built the Rudy Dam (R. 234). Gardner was Rudy's 
stepson. Gardner also said that the Rudy Dam was built 
after the McNaughton Dam (R. 10). Ross said that Rudy 
Dam and Tyzack Dam were built the same year and with 
reference to his marriage in 1907 he fixed the date of 
construction as the summer of 1905 (R. 334). Next down-
stream comes the Tyzack Dam. According to Tyzack, 
his father constructed the dam about "midway" of the 
period they lived in that area (R. 19). His testimony 
was that they moved there in 1900 and left in 1910. At 
the time he moved there in 1900, the McNaughton Dam 
was in (R. 19). He remembers that the McNaughton 
Dam was in place prior to the construction of the Tyzack 
Dam (R. 19). The Mantle Dam, according to Tyzack, 
~'"as put in after the Tyzack Dam (R. 21). It is to be 
remembered that both Rudy and Tyzack· were predeces-
sors in interest of the defendants (R. 18, 11, 12). 
No one directly connected with the construction of 
the Mantle Dam testified. However, Tyzack said it was 
later than the Tyzack Dam (R. 21); Gardner said that 
the Mantle Dam went in the same season that the Rudy 
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Dam 'Yas constructed (R. 12) nnd that both the Rudy 
Dam and the niantle Dam 'Yere constructed before the 
Tyzark Dam (R. 14). No 'Yitness, except Gardner and 
Rudy could remember back far enough to demember 
"-hen the :i\IcNaughton Dam "'"ent in. Gardner said he 
\Yent s"-imming· in the pond "'"hen he was 16 years old 
(1896) and the dam had been there a long time then (R. 
8). Rudy said nlcNaughtons were using water and that 
he became acquainted there in about 1890-1895 (R. 231). 
Several \Yitnesses remembered to about 1900; MeN a ugh-
ton (R. 139); Carroll (R. 43); Lewis (R. 73-74). Hoeft 
remembers it in 1903 (R. 88). There is no witness who 
testified that any one of the defendants' three dams was 
in prior to the Carroll Dam or the big MeN aught on Dam. 
Ross said at Page 333 that McNaughton Dam was not in 
first, but later admitted that he was not sure (R. 334). 
In view of all the positive evidence from those who were 
active in the construction of the dams and the total lack 
of conflicting evidence, the court could not have found 
otherwise than that the McNaughton Dam was in first. 
As to water coming into the gulch below MeN aughton 
Dam, see testimony of Merkley who said 3 to 7 feet 
flowed into Ashley Central Canal even though McNaugh-
ton kept a tight dam (R. 71). 
DEFENDANTS' EVIDENCE 
The witnesses called by the defendants had very 
little knowledge of conditions on the gulch. Defendant 
Fisher had never been on the McNaughton place prior 
to 1948 when he went looking for the water (R. 292). 
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Ross lived there and used water for 48 years and never 
once went upstream to see what McNaughton was doing 
with the water (R. 337). John B. Eaton had used water 
from the gulch for 35 years and was never on MeN augh-
ton's property until 1948 when they went looking for 
the water (R. 353). Christensen was an engineer who 
got his information from an inspection during the trial. 
Defendants also called Mr. and Mrs. Hoeft. Mr. Hoeft 
said McNaughton Dam was there in 1903 (R. 88) and 
that it was a tight dam, not overflowing (R. 100). He 
was there only once in 1903 and was not there again 
until 1918. Mrs. Hoeft was there first in 1906 and the 
MeN a ugh ton Dam was seen by her. She remembered it 
as a tight dam which did not overflow (R. 112, 116). 
These are defendants' only witnesses. 
The record thus not only supports the trial court~s 
findings, but essentially it stands without contradiction. 
With the evidence printed so that the court can readily 
refer to it, the appellants can gain little by asserting 
time, and again throughout their brief that there is no 
evidence to support the findings. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANTS HAD A FAIR TRIAL 
Throughout appellants' brief it is asserted that the 
parties both "proceeded" upon the theory that the 
waters in the McNaughton Gulch were subject to public 
appropriation. This simply isn't true, and nothing in 
the record can be or has been cited by appellants to 
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demonstrate the correctness of it. Reference to the plead-
ings "ill show that the plaintiffs simply pleaded in 
general terms that they were the owners of the right to 
use for irrigation and stock watering purposes the water 
arising in the McNaughton Gulch from seepage, perco-
lation, or otherwise, between the Carroll dam and the 
big dam described in the Statement of Facts. The plead-
ings do not state that said claim of ownership wa.s 
based upon public appropriation. The basis of that 
claim of ownership was not set forth at all (R. 27). 
There was no pretrial, no interrogatories were served, 
and the case went to trial on the plaintiff's general alle-
gation of ownership. Reference to the transcript of the 
evidence fails to show any opening statement by counsel 
for the plaintiffs. Therefore, if appellants did rely on 
the water being public, they did so without having had 
any right to do so. 
Further, during the course of the trial, on the second 
day, respondents made it clear that they were not ad-
mitting that this was a water course. At Page 201 of 
the transcript the plaintiff was asked whether or not he 
claimed to own this water during the wintertime. The 
plaintiff answered that he claimed it for stock watering 
purposes and then said, ''I don't want to tie myself 
down on this period when the water arises on our prop-
erty. It is a different position than where you are out 
on some other property.'' Counsel for the appellants 
then said, ''Well, all of the water rising on your property 
arises in the natural water course of the McNaughton 
Draw''' Counsel for respondents then made this ob-
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jection: "I object to the characterization of it as a water 
course, to the form of the question, your Honor, as some-
thing that is not in evidence.'' Certainly from this the 
appellants should have realized that McNaughton was 
claiming that the "\Vater which arose on his property was 
not governed by the general law of appropriation. 
From the beginning of this case, when the complaint 
was :filed, to the end of the trial, there is nothing in the 
record which can be pointed to as an admission by the 
respondents that they would not rely upon this being 
private water. There was a great amount of evidence 
directed to the question of the source of the water. If 
we had abandoned the private ownership theory, all of 
the evidence directed toward the fact that this water had 
its origin in private irrigation would have been imma-
terial. 
Further, every witness who testified was exhaus-
tively examined concerning his knowledge of the condi-
tions on the gulch as far back as he could remember. No 
witness called could have added anything to the record 
in this regard. 
At the close of the evidence, when the matter was 
argued, the trial judge asked counsel for the plaintiffs 
if he thought the doctrine of private ownership could be 
sustained. Counsel for the plaintiff confessed that he 
did not think so in view of the authorities which will be 
discussed in Section 2 hereof, and particularly in view 
of the case of Lehi Irrigation Company v. Jones, 202 P. 
(2d) 982. It is because of this confession made at the 
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argu·ment that the trial court noted in its memorandum 
decision that both parties had taken "the position that 
the "\Yaters in question are public "\Yaters and thus subject 
to appropriation'' (R. 40). It should be noted that the 
court did not find or comment upon the parties having 
'• proceeded'' through the trial on that theory. We there-
fore assert with full assurance that the record does not 
contradict us, that defendants 'Yere not misled. 
XO SHOWING ON l\IOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Perhaps the most conclusive thing, however, against 
this argument by appellants that they did not have a fair 
trial is the fact that upon their filing of a motion for new 
trial no affidavits were filed to show that appellants could 
have or would have submitted any new or different evi-
dence. Reference to the record will show that the court 
handed down its memorandum decision on September 14, 
1950 (R. 65). At that time the appellants certainly knew 
the theory upon which the case had been decided. There 
was a delay from September 14th to September 28th 
before the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were 
prepared and served on the defendants (R. 74). There-
after, the trial court delayed for nearly a month in sign-
ing and entering the findings and the decree (R. 73). 
The motion for new trial was filed on November 9th (R. 
76) which was nearly two full months after the court's 
memorandum decision. The motion for new trial was 
not argued until December 8th (R. 82) so that for nearly 
three full months the appellants knew that the court 
had decided the case on the theory that this water had 
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its origin in private irrigation and that it was private 
water. They, nevertheless, failed to locate any new 
evidence of any kind which would have any materiality 
on that issue and offered no affidavits and made no 
showing as to how they were prejudiced by the deciding 
of the case on that theory. 
Appellants say at Page 14 of their brief, ''Who can 
say that if the defendants had been advised that there 
was some question about the waters in dispute being 
subject to appropriation, the defendants could not have 
established such fact beyond controversy.'' The law is 
that the duty is on them to show at the time the motion 
for new trial is heard that they had new evidence and 
what it would have been. This court will not presume 
that such evidence existed, nor will it presume prejudice. 
In this regard, it would not be possible to find a 
stronger case in support of our position than the case 
of Beckstead v. Brinton, 105 Utah 395, 142 P. (2d) 409. 
There the trial court throughout the trial told the parties 
that he was following the law of the State of Utah, not 
the 0. P. A. regulations; that he was not interested in 
the ''slightest'' in whether the respondent in good faith 
wanted the premises for his own use. He made the state-
ment not only once but on numerous occasions through-
out the trial and thus discouraged counsel from inquir-
ing into that question. Then, without advising counsel 
of his change in views, the judge made findings that the 
owner in good faith wanted the premises for his own 
use. This was claimed to be prejudicial error. No affi-
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daYits "~ere filed in support of the motion for new trial. 
The Supreme Court said that it must assume that tbe 
trial judge, before making the findings, considered the 
eYidence presented. It then said: 
''In the absence of a showing on motion for 
a new trial that appellants were prejudiced by 
the lack of notification, that the court had experi-
enced a change of mind, we must presume that 
they were not prejudiced by such failure to be 
apprized.'' 
If in the face of such an emphatic declaration during 
the trial as was made in the Bri.nton case, this court will 
not assume prejudicial error, certainly it should not 
make such an assumption in this case. The duty was 
clearly upon the appellants in arguing their motion for 
new trial to show the court by affidavit or otherwise 
wherein they were prejudiced. When a motion is made, 
as this one was, upon the theory that the court surprised 
the parties by deciding the case on a theory not argued, 
the persons making the motion have an absolute duty 
of advising the court as to the evidence which they would 
put in if a new trial were granted. 
Rule 59 (a) sets forth the groundB upon which a 
motion for new trial may be made. The motion made 
herein could only conceivably come under grounds 3 or 
4. Rule 59(c) expressly requires an application for new 
trial based upon sections 3 or 4 to be supported by affi-
davit. It requires that these affidavits be served with 
the motion, and that time be allowed for the opposing 
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party to serve opposing affidavits. This rule was com-
pletely disregarded by the appellants. They had three 
full months after having been notified in court by a 
lengthy memorandum opinion as to the court's theory. 
They had one month after the findings were served on 
them within which to object to the findings and they had 
over one month after the decree was entered within which 
they could have procured affidavits. They totally ig-
nored Rule 59 and now on appeal their total showing as 
to prejudice is to ask the question, "Who can say that 
they would not have been able to find evidence if a new 
trial had been granted~'' Under the holding of Beck-
stead v. Brinton, supra, they have utterly failed to show 
any prejudice. 
We, therefore, respectfully submit that the defend-
ants were not misled. The pleadings of general owner-
ship, the evidence relating to the source of the water, 
and the express comments made (R. 201) certainly put 
them on notice that the water was claimed to have its 
origin in upper irrigation, and that it might be decided 
that the McNaughton Gulch was a private water course. 
If the court could possibly conclude in the face of the 
record that they were misled during the trial and that 
they were thus surprised by the trial judge's opinion, 
they had a duty to make a showing in support of their 
motion for new trial, as required by Rule 59. This they 
utterly failed to do. This court, under the authorities, 
will not presume that other or different evidence was 
available, nor that they were prejudiced. 
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II. Drn THE TRIAL CouRT ERR IN FINDING THAT THIS 
\\T.-\.S A PnrV.\TE WATER CouRsE~ 
The appellants assert that the evidence shows that 
this "~as public " .. ater subject to appropriation. They 
fail to tell the court ho'v such a conclusion, if reached, 
'vould help them. \V. e "'ill demonstrate under Point III 
hereof, that eV"en if this is public "Tater, the evidence 
conclusi,ely shows and the trial court expressly found 
that the plaintiffs were prior in time and in right to any 
of the defendants. 'V e will address ourself first to the 
correctness of the trial court's conclusion that these 
\Yaters were private waters, and will then proceed under 
Point No. III to demonstrate that even if the court did 
err in its conclusion of law, it nevertheless was correct 
in its facts and result. 
\Ve submit that under the evidence outlined above 
the court correctly found that prior to 1885 the Mc-
Naughton Gulch was a dry gulch (R. 4 and 16). The 
flow of water in the McNaughton Gulch had its origin 
in upper irrigation. Gardner testified that in 1885 the 
gulch 'vas a dry gulch and that in 1886 there was not 
much land being irrigated along the gulch; and that 
there was little water in the gulch except canal water 
(R. 16). Rudy said that the flow of water in the gulch 
increased from year to year (R. 234). Lewis testified 
that the flow in the gulch would come after they started 
irrigating the farm lands above (R. 82). Carroll said 
that there is not much water in the gulch after irrigation 
stops (R. 56). Frank Lee said that the gulch carried 
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seepage water, and that there was not much seepage in 
the wintertime (R. 37). Both Carroll and McNaughton 
testified that the stream was made up of seepage water 
and waste water from upper irrigation (R. 41 and 158). 
The judge observed the premises and the drainage areas 
on each side of the McNaughton Gulch. The evidence 
was conclusive that the drainage from the irrigA:tted 
lands flows into the gulch both on the North and South 
side thereof. From this testimony the trial court found 
that the water in question had its origin in the irriga-
tion of upper lands. 
Since this finding is warranted by the evidence, we 
have the question of law as to whether or not this makes 
the water private water owned by the person on whose 
land it arises. In this regard the trial court has written 
a detailed eighteen-page memorandum decision which 
analyzes the development of the law in the state of Utah. 
We refer the court to the record, page 48, for this deci-
sion. We will not attempt here to re-present the trial 
court's reasoning. We note only that in the case of 
Smithfield West Bench Irr. Co. v. Unio.n Central Life 
Ins. Co., et al., 105 U. 468, 142 P. (2d) 866, the court was 
dealing with seepage and waste water much as that in-
volved here. The court refused to decide whether or not 
waters of this nature were subject to appropriation. 
Judge Wolfe noted at page 479 that in the absence of 
statute it is generally held that such waste water and 
seepage water cannot be appropriated. However, in 
that case no one had filed on the water after 1903 and 
there was no showing of a diligence right prior to 1903 
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\Yhen filings 'Yith the State Engineer were not necessary. 
The court simply raised the question as to whether or 
not these "~a ters could be appropriated. 
In the Tl'"rathall v. Johnson, 86 Ut. 50, 40 P. (2d) 755, 
the court did say that "~aters which have their origin in 
priYate irrigation are not subject to the law of appro-
priation. 
The later case of Riordian v. Westwood, 203 P. (2d) 
922, was dealing with water which had its origin in 
natural sources, and the trial court here distinguished 
that case on that ground. Therefore, at least until the 
case of Lehi Irrigation Company v. Jones, 202 P. (2d) 
982, this court had never affirmatively stated, as far as 
my research reveals, that waters having their origin in 
artificial irrigation were subject to public appropriation. 
In the case of Lehi Irrigation Co. v. Jones, supra, 
everyone conceded that the spring in question had in-
creased in flow because of the fact that upper irrigators 
had applied Deer Creek water on Provo Bench._. The 
waters left Provo Bench and had found an outlet in a 
spring which arose on the ground of Jones. Jones filed 
on the water on the theory that it was open to public 
appropriation. The Lehi Irrigation Company protested 
the filing because it had always used all of the flow from 
the spring. The. court affirmed the State Engineer in 
approving the application of Jones. In doing this it in-
dicated that such waters were subject to appropriation 
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In view of the Jones case, we thought that at least 
as against everyone except the irrigators who waste the 
water from their land this court had held that the waters 
were subject to public appropriation. We, however, 
note that there is a distinguishing feature between this 
case and the Jones case, in that here the waters found 
their way to what had been a dry gulch and never lost 
their identity by commingling with water from natural 
sources, while in the Jones case the waters found their 
way to a natural water course and commingled with 
waters which had their origin in natural sources and 
thus lost their identity. If this distinction is sound, and 
the trial court argues that it is, then the trial judge 
should be affirmed upon the basis presented in his mem-
orandum decision. 
III. EVEN IF THE CouRT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
WATERS WERE PRIVATE WATERS, IT NEVERTHELESS 
ARRIVED AT A CoRRECT RESULT. 
It is well established under the Utah cases that a 
trial , court will be affirmed if its decision is right in 
result, even though the wrong reason is stated for it. 
There are many cases so holding, but a very recent one 
is the case of Tree v. White, 110 Utah 233, 171 P. (2d) 
398. The court says : 
'' 'A decision right in result will not be re-
versed even though the reason stated for it is 
wrong. 3 Am. Jur., p. 563.' 
'See also Rosehill Cemetery Co. v. Chicago, 
352 Ill. 11, 185 N. E. 170, 87 A. L. R. 7 42 and 3 Am. 
Jur. p. 367, Sec. 825.' 
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·The appellant may not preY ail unless there 
has been error in the result as well as error In 
the reasoning.' " 
The appellants here simply argue that the trial 
court erred in reasoning that the waters in question 
'Yere priYate 'vaters. They urge that the court should 
have found that the "\Vaters 'vere public waters subject 
to appropriation. They then neglect to proceed to tell 
the court what conclusion the trial court would have 
been compelled to reach from its findings of fact had it 
concluded that these were public waters. 
The trial court found in favor of plaintiffs on every 
issue of fact necessary to establish a prior appropria-
tion. The e\'idence is uncontradicted that the Carroll 
Dam was the first diversion on the MeN a ugh ton Gulch, 
that the MeN a ugh ton Dam was second, and that both 
were constructed prior to 1895. It is also uncontradicted 
that both dams were built prior to any of the defendant's 
dams (R. 10, 19, 21, 43, 7 4, 139, 234). Plaintiffs diverted 
all of the water which came down to those dams because 
the lower dam was a permanent, tight dam (R. 12, 15, 
19, 63, 73, 100, 140); all of the waters thus diverted were 
necessary to irrigate the 80 acre farm (R. 29, 101, 221) 
and at times it was necessary to augment these waters 
with canal waters (R. 152). The diversion by plaintiffs 
was made prior to 1903, when water could be appro-
priated in Utah simply by diversion and use. See Wells-
ville-East Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay Land & Live-
stock, 104 Utah 448, 137 P. (2d) 634. The court from the 
evidence so found on each of these issues of fact. This 
31 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
conclusively shows a prior appropriation by the plain-
tiffs superior to the right of any of the defendants. It 
is thus clear that had the court concluded that these 
waters were subject to prior appropriation, then from 
its findings on these issues it would have been compelled 
to enter the decree which was in fact entered. The plain-
tiffs had made a prior appropriation of all .of the water 
aceumulating in the gulch at the Carroll Dam and at 
the MeN a ugh ton Dam. The dams had been maintained 
continuously since 1895 and all of the defendants ad-
mitted, as is shown by the Statement of Facts, that they 
had never in the 48 years prior to 1948 attempted to 
interfere with these permanent dams. 
It is then obvious that if these waters having their 
origin in upper artificial irrigation were private waters, 
they belonged to the McNaught.ons because they arose 
on the McNaughton lands and he used them for 50 years. 
If the court is wrong in its conclusion of law as to the 
nature of these waters, then the facts as found, conclu-
sively show that the McNaughtons made the first valid 
appropriaiton. In fact, there is little evidence from 
which the trial court could have found that any of the 
defendants, or their predecessors, diverted any water 
from the gulch prior to 1905. From 1905 forward it 
has never been possible to appropriate water from sur-
face streams by usage alone and there is no evidence 
that any of the defendants made filings with the State 
Engineer. We, therefore, seriously question that these 
defendants have any water rights. Tyzack placed the 
construction .of the defendants' dams as midway in the 
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period \Yhen he and his family liYed in that area. He 
tl•stified that they moved there in 1900 and moved away 
in 1910 ( R. 19). He also testified that the dams were 
not constructed until after his parents acquired the land 
\Yhich they farmed, and the record shows without con-
tradiction that Tyzack's Father acquired the land in 
October of 1905 (R. 355). Mr. Ross testified that the 
dams were put in just two years before his marriage and 
he \Yas married in 1907 (R. 334). It is, therefore, ex-
tremely doubtful that the defendants have any water 
rights. They are located downstream from the plaintiff 
so that they could not have acquired a right by adverse 
use. (See TVellsville East Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay 
Land & Livestock, supra). The evidence does not show 
a diversion prior to 1903, and certainly after 1903 they 
would have been required to file to initiate a water right. 
(See rv· ellsville East Field Irrigation Co. v. Lin.dsatJ 
Land & Livestock, supra, Duchesne County v. Humphries, 
106 Utah 332, 148 P. (2d) 338, Smith v. S(};(Ybders, 189 P. 
(2d) 701. 
The appellants assert that the court must disregard 
the findings of fact made by the trial court which are 
material only to the theory of prior appropriation. This 
court will never assume that the trial court made findings 
without considering the evidence. (See Beckstead v. 
Brinton, 105 Utah 395, 142 P. (2d) 409, Gordon v. Mur-
ray City, 151 P. (2d) 193, 106 Utah, 583). Thus the 
court's findings and the evidence both require the affirm-
ance of this decree, regardless of which theory of the 
law the court adopts as being correct. If it is private 
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water, plaintiffs win because it arises on their lands. If 
it is public water, they made the only valid appropria-
tion and have used the water, unmolested, for half a 
century. 
IV. THE APPELLANTS HAvE NoT BEEN PREJUDICED. 
It must be remembered that under the uncontra-
dicted evidence the McNaughtons have maintained a 
tight dam across the McNaughton Gulch above the points 
of diversion used by the defendants since at least 1895 
(R. 12, 15, 19, 63, 73, 100, 140). Rudy and Tyzack, 'vho 
were predecessors in inter~st of the defendants, readily 
acknowledge that the MeN a ugh ton Dam was in ahead of 
the defendants' dams (R. 19, 2, 34), and according to 
MeN a ugh ton in all of the years from 1900 to 1948 there 
had never been any trouble on the stream (R. 183). 
Ed Hoft, a predecessor in interest to one of de-
fendants, acknowledged that the McNaughton Dam was 
a tight dam and that it did not overflow (R. 100); and 
that from 1919 until he sold the property he never had 
occasion to disturb the McNaughton Dam (R. 102). 
Ernest Johnson owned part of the defendants' lands and 
he said that he never bothered to walk upstream during 
the time he farmed the lands (R. 125). Mr. Ross, who 
was a predecessor in interest to some of the defendants, 
was on the stream for 48 years, and he never once 
had occasion to go upstream to the McNaughton farm 
(R. 33). John B. Eaton has farmed some of defendant's 
property for 35 years, and he never during all of that 
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time had occasion to go to the McNaughton property 
until1948 'Yhen this trouble started (R. 353). 
It is thus clear that for half a century the McNaugh-
tons haYe maintained a tight dam and have diverted all 
the water from the gulch and applied it to the irrigation 
of their lands. The dam "\Vashed out in 1947 (R. 375). 
It "~as replaced in 1948 and 1949 (R. 171) and of course 
when it was replaced the water was shut off. Fisher, 
who had just become an owner of land on the gulch (R. 
275) missed the water and went upstream to find it (R. 
276, 293). He saw the dams and ditches of McNaughton. 
The dam had been recently replaced and the ditches had 
been recently cleaned. Fisher thought the dam and 
ditches were new construction (R. 281, 287). He took 
his shovel and diverted the water out of the :1\tfcNaughton 
ditches (R. 294) and then had McNaughton arrested. The 
defendants selected as their attorney Hugh B. Colton, 
who was at that time County Attorney, and rather than 
bring a civil action, they used the criminal law ( R. 159). 
Threatened with further criminal prosecution for using 
the water as he had done for half a century, McNaughton 
brought this suit to quiet title against the claims of the 
defendants. He was upstream from all of them. He has 
used the water in question for at least 50 years openly, 
notoriously, continuously, adversely and under claim of 
right; for fifty years his use had never been challenged. 
During practically all of the 50 year period (until 1939) 
water rights could be acquired by adverse use. Wells..., 
ville-East Field Irrigation Company v. Lindsay Land & 
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Livestock Company, 104 Utah 448, 137 P. (2d) 634. The 
defendants are thus in the position of attempting to upset 
the established usage which has prevailed for all these 
years and which has been known by their predecessors 
to have existed. There is not one word of testimony in 
the record that the amount of water diverted by the 
McNaughtons is in excess of the needs of their land. The 
only evidence relating to the need of water is that ad-
duced by the plaintiffs, and it is all to the effect that the 
water diverted has all been necessary, that it all can be 
retained on the MeN aughton land, and that at times it 
is inadequate so that canal water must be commingled 
with it (R. 29, 221, 101, 152). 
The flow of water in the McNaughton Gulch is 
variable. When farmers upstream permit their waste 
water to run uncontrolled into the gulch there may be 
substantial quantities of water present (R. 52, 158). By 
impounding the same behind this large dam, which is 
20 feet high, 100 feet long, and will back the water along 
the channel for 150 yards, MeN a ugh ton can control the 
size of irrigation stream for the irrigation of his farm. 
It would be almost impossible to divide the use of the 
water into definite hours per week or per day, because 
the amount of water in the gulch is so variable. One day 
there may be large quantities of water because of the 
irrigation practices followed upstream and on the next 
day there may be very little water. The dam which the 
· McNaughtons maintain is a permanent dirt-filled dam, 
not adapted to removal and replacement. 
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The court should also note Exhibits 1 and A, and 
the reeord at Pag-es ~61-2 relating to the existence of a 
drain ditch on the bottom (east) end of the McNaughton 
farm. The ~lcNaughton lands straddle the gulch. On 
each side of the gulch the land slopes toward the gulch, 
in addition to sloping generally to the east. Across the 
entire east end of the ~lcNaughton property is a drain 
ditch which will intercept every bit of water which would 
otherwise run off the MeN aughton land to the east (R. 
261, ~6~). Therefore, if any excess water were applied 
to the ~le~aughton lands,- it would either find its way 
directly back into the gulch or would find its way to the 
drain ditch on the east end of the MeN aught.on property 
which would return the water directly to the gulch at a 
point above two of the points of diversion used by the 
defendants. The third point of diversion, which is above 
the drain ditch, crosses the drain ditch and the water 
from the drain ditch could be very easily diverted into 
the first ditch of the defendants, the trial court so found 
(Finding No. 10, page 70). It would, therefore, be 
physically impossible for McNaughton to divert the 
water away from these defendants or to hold it away 
from them. 
This is an important consideration. See Sharp v. 
Whitmore, 51 Utah 14, 168 P. 273, where the quantity of 
water awarded to Whitmore was increased by the 
Supreme Court from four feet to five feet. The lands 
sloped directly to the creek and any excess water would 
be returned to the creek ahead of the plaintiffs' point 
of diversion. The stream varied greatly as to the quan-
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tity of water available. Justice Frick noted particularly 
that in increasing the quantity of water above that 
awarded by the trial court no possible injury could be 
done to the downstream users. If Whitmore were limited 
to less water than he had used in the past he might suffer 
irreparable injury, but if too much water were applied 
to the Whitmore lands, it would find its way directly 
back to the stream and be available for downstream 
users. Such is the condition which prevails here. There 
is not one word of evidence to the effect that MeN a ugh-
ton has been diverting more water than he needs, but 
to the contrary, the evidence is that there was not suffi-
cient water in the gulch even to meet his needs (R. 29, 
101, 152, 221). Even were there too much water diverted, 
it could not injure the appellants because the slope of 
the lands and the location of the defendants' points of 
diversion are such that any excess water must be re-
turned directly to the channel and be thus available to 
the defendants. 
V. THE CouRT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE RuDY DEPOSITION 
Since the Rudy deposition is for the most part only 
corroborating other uncontradicted evidence, it probably 
is not too material whether the court committed error in 
admitting the deposition. It was admittedly inadmissable 
as against some of these defendants anyway, because 
they were not given notice, nor even thought of as being 
parties to this suit at the time the deposition was taken. 
The only contention concerning the deposition is that 
the judge in fixing the order for the taking of the deposi· 
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tion did not name the clerk of the court to 'vhom the 
deposition should be returned. It is correct that the 
court did not so proYide, but in vie"T of that fact that 
notice of the taking of the deposition was properly 
serYed upon fiye of the defendants and the deposition 
'vas actually returned to the clerk of the District Court, 
it is difficult to see how the defendants were prejudiced. 
X o authority is cited by the appellant for their assertion 
that this 'vas prejudicial error. The new rules (Rule 27) 
do not contain a like provision, and we have been unable 
to find any authority indicating that the failure of the 
. court to specify the place where the deposition should 
be sent is too material. It should also be noted that the 
petition was filed in the District Court of Uintah County, 
and that both the order and the notice of hearing were 
entitled in that court. There is no material finding of 
fact which is dependent alone upon Rudy's testimony, 
and we submit that the court committed no error in ad-
mitting it. 
VI. FINDING No. 2 SHoULD BE CoRRECTED 
Finding No. 2 entered by the trial court recites that 
additional parties were added to the case by stipulation. 
Reference to the Record 227-8 will show that there were 
additional parties who entered their appearance who 
were not covered by said finding. The following names 
should be added to the finding: Jack Turner, and Marie 
L. Turner; W. S. Ross and Fern Ross Faucett, and 
Myron D. Perry. These persons all entered their appear-
ance and of course are bound by the judgment. I-Io,v-
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ever, the transcript may eventually be unavailable and 
the judgment and decree should show the names of these 
additional parties. This court should in its opinion 
direct the trial court to add these additional defendants 
in Finding No. 2. 
It is respectfully submitted that the action of the 
trial judge should be affirmed. 
EDWARD W. CLYDE 
Attorney for Respondents 
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